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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent, Davis County, agrees with the facts 
as stated by Appellants with the following exceptions: 
1. Lines 4-6, page 2 of the Statement of Facts in 
Appellants' Brief fails to mention that plaintiff a I s o 
brought this action for the purpose of obtaining a decla-
ratory judgment that under Title 17, Section 6, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, the Board of County Commissioners of 
Davis County, Utah, with the consent of the Board of 
Trustees of the South Davis Water Improvement District, 
upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with law and 
procedure established by 17-6-3 U.C.A. 1953, may by reso-
lution exclude plaintiffs' property from South Davis Water 
Improvement District. 
2. Line 10, page 2 of the Statement of Facts in Appel-
lants' Brief states that the Commissioners of Davis County 
were joined as parties defendant. It is true that Davis 
County was joined and that the Commissioners were named 
in the complaint, but never at any time were they served 
with Summons and the Davis County Commissioners never 
have been and are not now parties to this action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The decision of the lower court should be affirmed be-
cause the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted under the provisions of the Utah Declaratory 
Judgments Act as against Respondent, Davis County. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE 
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GRANTED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT AS AGAINST RE-
SPONDENT, DAVIS COUNTY. 
In the second paragraph of the prayer of Plaintiffs' 
complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment by the 
court that under Title 17, Chapter 6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, the Board of County Commissioners of Davis County, 
with the consent of the Board of Trustees of South Davis 
Water Improvement District upon proper notice of hearing 
in accordance with law and procedures established by 17-6-3 
U. ·C. A. 1953, may by resolution exclude Plaintiffs' property 
from South Davis Water Improvement District. This would 
appear to be the only relief sought by Plaintiffs in the prayer 
of their complaint as against Respondent, Davis County. 
Under the provisions of Title 17, Chapter 6, U. C. A. 
1953, the Board of County Commissioners are granted cer-
tain powers and authority in regard to the creation of such 
an improvement district. Section 17-6-3 provides, among 
other things, that in the County's resolution creating such 
a district, the Board of Commissioners may change the 
boundary lines "as may be considered by the Board to be 
equitable and necessary including changes in the boundaries 
thereof to assure that the District shall contain no property 
which will not be benefited by the proposed improvements." 
This section further provides that any property owner who 
shall have filed a written protest as to his property being 
included in the district may within 30 days after the adop-
tion of the resolution establishing such district, apply to the 
District Court for a writ of review of the actions of the 
Board of County Commissioners. This is the only authority 
the Board of County Commissioners has in regard to vary-
ing or changing the boundary lines of an improvement dis-
trict. Plaintiffs concede (page 9) that they are unable to 
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bring a declaratory judgment action under this section after 
the lapse of this statutory period, to determine whether the 
County Commission correctly decided the question of bene-
fit, or to determine whether County Commission followed 
statutory procedure in establishing this district, and thus 
they are not attempting to invoke the specific power of 
County Commission to change boundary lines under this 
section. 
Title 17, Chapter 6, Section 20, U. C. A. 1953, sets up 
a procedure for the dissolution of an improvement district 
by petition of the Board of Trustees of the District to the 
District Court. In the dissolution proceeding neither the 
County nor the Board of County Commissioners has any 
responsibility or authority and it is not even a requisite of 
the statute that they or either of them be served with notice 
of the hearing. 
Thus, once an improvement district is organized under 
the statute and trustees are appointed other than the County 
Commissioners, the Board of County Commissioners nor the 
County has any further control or authority in relation to 
the District. The District thus having been created becomes 
a quasi-municipal entity with its own officers, power to levy 
taxes and various other powers and functions of a political 
subdivision. This court has so held in the case of Tygeson 
vs. Magna Water Company, 226 Pacific 2d at page 127, as 
follows: 
"In all of these acts once the initiating agencies have 
acted and a district has been formed, their functions 
cease and the governing body of the district assumes 
full control of the district and its properties. This 
court has held that the Metropolitan Water Districts 
and the Water Conservancy Districts organized un-
der those Acts were separate and distinct arms of 
the government and not special commissions, boards, 
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private corporations or associations within the pur-
view of the constitutional prohibition. See Lehi City 
v. Meiling, City Recorder, 87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 530 
and Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 
106 Utah 55, 145 P. 2d 503. The fact that proceed-
ings to initiate an improvement district is left to the 
county commissioners of the Counties in which the 
Districts can be formed might lend some support to 
an argument that a district would not be a separate 
and distinct arm of the government but merely be an 
arm of a county for the purpose of carrying out a 
county function, were it not for the fact that 
once the District is actually organized the county 
has no further connection with the District except 
the ministerial one of levying any taxes certified 
to it by the Board of Trustees) a duty of the county 
which is similar to that performed by it for Boards 
of Education under the provision of Sec. 75-12-10 
U.C.A. 1943. Once the District is formed the Board 
of Trustees have full control and supervision of 
the property and the conduct of affairs of the Dis-
trict. The District must have its own seal and its 
Board of Trustees may sue and be sued. Also the 
taxes which are certified by the Board to the county 
commissioners can be levied only on property within 
the District. If a District were merely an arm of the 
county then the general taxes levied whether used 
for benefits inuring to the District or not should be 
levied against all residents of the county rather than 
on those only within the District." 
(Emphasis ours) 
For these reasons as against the Respondent, Davis 
County, the Plaintiffs in their complaint have failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. This would be true 
regardless of the allegations set forth by the plaintiff or the 
proof adduced in support thereof, since under any allegations 
of fact, County would have no authority to disconnect terri .. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tory from such an improvement district. Therefore, the 
District Court properly dismissed the Plain tiffs' complaint 
as failing to state a cause of action as against Davis County. 
For the reasons stated above, Appellants' Arguments II 
and III have no direct application to position of Respondent, 
Davis County. These arguments are being answered in the 
Brief of Respondents, Board of Trustees of the South Davis 
Water Improvement District. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON J. HESS 
J. DUFFY PALMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent, 
Davis County 
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